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IN THE SUPREME COURT
OF THE STATE OF UTAH

STEPHEN FRANK HYDE,
Plaintiff and Respondent,
-vs-

LAURI LEE HYDE,

Case No.
11463

Defendant and Appellant.

RESPONDENT'S BRIEF

STATEMENT OF THE KIND OF CASE
This is a divorce action which was commenced in January, 1968, by the Plaintiff (respondent) Stephen Frank Hyde,
against the defendant (appellant) Lauri Lee Hyde. The plaintiff sought custody of the minor child of the parties and an
equitable distribution of the property.

DISPOSITION IN LOWER COURT
Many hours of testimony, evidence, and arguments
having been received and considered, the trial court entered
it's decree that the plaintiff be granted a divorce from the
defendant and that the plaintiff be awarded the care, custody,
and control of the parties' minor child subject to the defendant's right of reasonable and liberal visitation.
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RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL
The plaintiff seeks to have the decision of the lower
court affirmed, and to recover his costs incurred as a result of
this appeal.
STATEMENT OF FACTS
The plaintiff essentially agrees with the statement of
facts as set forth in the defendant's brief. However, there are
a few points which plaintiff feels need to be corrected and
clairified.
The defendant left the home of the parties on November 2, 1967, "to go to Phoenix for a vacation for two weeks."
(TR. p. 118, 2-4) She had stated that her family obligations
were getting too much for her, and that she was under such
stress that she had to get away for a couple of weeks. (TR. p.
117, 30 and TR. p. 118, 1-2) She indicated that at the time
she felt that she was losing all identity, and that no one really
cared too much about her, or what happened to her, or what
she did. (TR. p. 5, 20-24 ).
When the defendant left for her two-week vacation,
she had not made arrangements for the care of the minor
child. The subject had been discussed by the parties, but the
plaintiff was actually left with the full responsibility to make
any arrangements for the care of the child. (TR. p. 124) While
the defendant was in Phoenix, the plaintiff did have the defendant's mother care for the child during the time he was at
work or at school, but all other times he had the complete
care of the child. He fed her, clothed her, changed her, put
her to bed, and washed and cared for his minor daughter.
(TR. p. 120-121).
The plaintiff traveled to Phoenix at the end of December, 1967, and talked with the defendant in an attempt to
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determine if she was going to return. At that time, the
defendant stated that she was not ready to come back yet;
that she did not know how long before she might even want
to come back; and that she may never want to come back.
(TR. p. 118) At this point the plaintiff retained counsel and
filed this divorce action on or about January 9, 1968. The
defendant still chose to reside in Phoenix, Arizona, until she
returned on April 14, 1968, more than five and one-half
months after she had departed.
The defendant's statement of fact setting forth the
legal proceedings before the trial court is essentially correct.
PLAINTIFF'S POSITION
The trial court's decision should be affirmed and the
plaintiff should retain custody of his daughter who has been
in his care, custody, and control since November 2, 1967, for
the following reasons:
1. This was an action for divorce and not one for
separation, therefore, the provisions of 30-3-5 UCA, 1953,
controlled and directed the trial court with respect to what
orders it made in relation to the custody of the child. The
court could, therefore, make any order in relation to the child
concerned as it found to be equitable. The provisions of
30-3-10 UCA, 1953, which apply to cases involving separation
did not apply and the plaintiff was not, therefore, under the
burden to rrove that the defendant was an immoral, imcompetent, or otherwise improper person.
2. Even if the provisions of 30-3-10 UCA, 1953, were
held to be controlling, or of considerable weight, in providing
the proper standard for determining which parent should receive the care, custody, and control of the minor child of the
parties, the plaintiff presented to the court sufficient evidence
to sustain the court's findings of fact that the defendant was
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an unfit and improper person to have the custody of the
minor child.
ARGUMENT
POINT I.
THE TRIAL COURT AWARDED THE PLAINTIFF
CUSTODY OF THE MINOR CHILD BECAUSE THE EVIDENCE INDICATED THAT SUCH AN A WARD OF CUSTODY
TO THE FATHER WAS EQUITABLE AND IN THE BEST
INTERESTS OF THE CHILD.
This being an action for divorce, the trial court was
authorized by 30-3-5, UCA, 1953, to make such orders in relation to the minor child of the parties as it determined to be
equitable and in the best interests of the child.
The defendant contends that the plaintiff had the
burden of proving the defendant is an unfit mother and that
the plaintiff failed to meet this burden. This contention, if
true, would mean that 30-3-10, UCA, 1953, controlled any
order of the trial relative to custody of children in divorce
cases rather than 30-3-5, UCA, 1953.
The Utah Supreme Court in the case of Johnson vs.
Johnson, 7 Utah 2d 263, 323 P. 2d 16 (1958) had indicated
that in divorce proceedings a father may be awarded custody
of a child under the age of 10 years without the necessity for
the court to find that the mother was an unfit parent. Justice
Crockett stated:
"The question thus posed was treated in extenso in Sampsell vs. Holt, (115 Utah 73, 202
P. 2d 550, 552.) wherein Justice Wolfe pointed out the distinction between 30-3-10 which
by its language concerns cases of 'separation'
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whereas Section 30-3-5 is expressly applicable
to 'divorce'. It being, 'When a decree of
divorce is made the court may make such
orders in realtion to the children, * * * as may
be equitable.***"
The law with respect to this issue is well summarized by Chief Justice McDonough in the
recent case of Steiger vs. Steiger (4 Utah 2d
273, 293 P. 2d 418, 420.)
"This court has stated that a divorced mother
has no absolute right to the custody of minor
children * * * but the policy of our decisions
has been to give weight to the view that all
things being equal, preference should be given
to the mother in awarding custody of a child
of tender years, * * * and this view is based
upon the oft-stated purpose of the award of
custody to provide for the child's best interests
and welfare.***''
"The instant case is a good example of the undesirable and impractical results that would
emanate from adopting the view urged by
plaintiff that the court must invariably, in all
circumstances, awarding the custody of children under 10 to the mother unless she is found
to be an immoral or imcompetent person; it
likewise exemplifies the wisdom of the prior
adjudications of this court that questions of
custody are always equitable and that the controlling consideration is the welfare of the
children involved."
The Supreme Court in the case of Ryan vs. Ryan, 17
Utah 2d 44, 404 P. 2d 24 7 (196 5) where children under 10
years of age were concerned, determined that there did not
seem to be evidence to find that the mother was an immoral
person, but determined that it was in the best interests of the
children that the father be awarded custody.
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The Utah legislature saw fit to pass two separate
statutes regarding the custody of children. Section 30-3-10 indicates that when parents separated, the mother of any children under 10 years of age should,
"be entitled to the care, control and custody
of all such children ... provided further, that
if it shall be made to appear to a court of competent jurisdiction that the mother is immoral,
incompetent or otherwise an improper person,
then the court may award the custody of the
children to the father ... "
30-3-5:

On the other hand, the legislature stated in Section
"When a decree of divorce is made the court
may make such orders in relation to the
children, ... as may be equitable ... "

The Utah Supreme Court in considering these two sections has previously stated that 30-3-5 applies in cases of
divorce and 30-3-10 applies in cases of separation, It has ruled
that in granting a decree of divorce, the question of child
custody is always equitable and that the controlling consideration is the welfare of the children involved. f ohnson vs.
fohnson, supra; Samesell vs. Holt, supra; Steiger vs. Steiger,
supra; Walton vs. Coffman, 110 Utah 1, 169 P. 2d 97 (1946);
Smith vs. Smith, 1 Utah 2d 75, 262 P. 2d 283 (1953 ). There
appears a just and valid reason why the court should continue
to observe the distinction between the two sections provided
by the legislature. Under conditions of separation where the
rights of the parties have not been fully determined the presumption that the mother should have the custody of children under 10 years of age, unless it is proven that she is
immoral, incompetent or improper person, probably is based
upon sound reasoning. On the other hand, when a divorce decree is entered and the rights of the parties and the children
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are finally adjudicated, there also appears to be sound reasoning that any order relative to minor children should be based
upon equity, thus allowing either the father or mother to be
awarded custody, with the prime and controlling factor being
the best interest and welfare of the child.
The factual evidence in the instant case which sustains the trial court and indicates that it is in fact in the best
interests of the minor child that she be in the custody of her
father also proves that the mother is unfit and is an improper
person to have custody of said child. In an effort to avoid repetition this evidence will be reviewed under Point II as hereafter set forth.
POINT II
PLAINTIFF PRESENTED EVIDENCE WHICH PROVED THAT THE DEFENDANT IS AN UNFIT MOTHER AND
NOT A PROPER PERSON TO HA VE THE CARE, CONTROL
AND CUSTODY OF THE MINOR CHILD.
The trial court considered this matter carefully and
had considerable time to weigh the evidence and enter the
proper ruling. The parties first appeared before the court on
April 23, 1968. Subsequent hearings were held on June 17,
1968, September 10, 1968, and September 11, 1968. The
court entered the decree of divorce on September 24, 1968.
The court had an opportunity to thus become acquainted with
and to observe the parties in this case more than would be
true in the ordinary divorce situation.
The trial court did find that the mother was not a

fit and proper person to have custody of the minor child. On

November 2, 1967, the defendant left her husband and child
and went to Phoenix, Arizona. She previously discussed her
leaving with the plaintiff, indicating that she was under such
stress, that her family obligations were getting too much for
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her and that she had to get away, that she would like to go to
Phoenix for a vacation for two weeks. (TR. p. 118, 1-6) Instead
of returning home at the end of two weeks, the defendant remained in Arizona until April 14, 1968, when she did return
to Utah. (TR. p. 101, 7) The defendant had refused to return
to her home although the plaintiff had traveled to Arizona to
request her return on two separate occasions. He discussed
this matter with her in Arizona on or about December 26,
1967, and on or about March 15, 1968. (TR. p. 118) The
plaintiff had also discussed this matter with the defendant
over the telephone, and in one telephone conversation he indicated that the baby was sick with a fever. He asked her if
she wouldn't come back. Her only reply was, "Can't you take
care of the baby?" (TR. p. 119, 18-25) When the plaintiff
requested the defendant to return in December, 1967, the
plaintiff stated, "I'm not ready to come back yet; I don't
know how long before I might even want to come back; I
may never want to come back." (TR. p. 118).
The defendant had not made specific arrangements
for the care of the baby while she would be gone for the two
weeks, let alone the five and one-half months she was gone.
The plaintiff had to make the arrangements for the care of
the child while the mother absented herself from the home.
(TR. p. 123, 22-30 and 124 ).
The defendant testified that she felt she was losing
the grasp on everything that meant anything to her, and that
she thought she had to get away to find herself. She felt like
she was losing all identity and that no one really cared too
much about her, or what happened to her, or what she did.
(TR. p. 5, 20-24) She stated to Dr. Jarvis, her psychiatrist,
that, "I'm the most insecure person in the world." (TR. p. 39,
5, 6) Dr. Jarvis stated at the hearing that this factor still continued with her to a degree. (TR. p. 39, 10-12) Dr. Jarvis
further stated that her response in leaving her child and going
to Phoenix was not a healthy response to the situation that
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existed. (TR. p. 51, 29) Dr. Jarvis further indicated that he
could not guarantee that the defendant would not leave the
child and her responsibilities again if the pressures of life reoccured. (TR. p. 54, 18-30) The defendant further testified
that she felt she had to leave her daughter before her daughter
rejected her too. (TR. p. 73, 6-15).
Dr. Evans, the child's pediatrician, indicated that he
had counseled with the defendant on many occasions. He
stated that the defendant's performance in the last year, or
last ten months, considering her capabilities, had been poor
poor and that what the next period of time would be he had
no way of knowing; except that the sort of illness that she
rightly suspects that she has is not one which is easily cured.
Dr. Evans stated that he was speaking of her problems as a
parent. He indicated that he agreed with Dr. Jarvis that he
could not guarantee that she would not have a lapse back to
the condition she was in when he first saw her, which were
described as great anxiety, bewilderment, confusion and instability. (Dr. Evans, TR. p. 7 and 8).
The defendant admitted that while she was in Arizona
she dated other men. She stated that this was all so that she
could "find herself." (TR. p. 99, 20-30 and p. 100) The defendant admitted that she was in the presence of other men
and had been dating the month prior to her leaving to go to
Phoenix. (TR. p. 97, 7-12) The defendant admitted that on
at least four occasions when the baby was 10 or 11 months
old, prior to her going to Arizona, she left the baby and went
out and stayed until two or three o'clock in the morning.
(TR. p. 9, 1-8) The defendant further testified that since she
had returned from Arizona she had been dating men, and
some of these occasions even involved periods of time when
she had the child with her for visitation purposes. (TR. p. 102,
10-23).
The court properly found that it was in the best interest of the minor child that the father be awarded her
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custody. The court found in paragraph 7 of the Findings of
Fact that:
"The defendant is not a fit and proper person
to have the care, custody and control of the
minor child of the parties; she having left the
child ... and stayed away by absenting herself
from the home and the child for over five
months, and in other ways demonstated that
she is not able to care for the child and is not
a fit and proper person to have the care,
custody and control of the child. That the defendant is suffering from a great emotional instability. That her absenting herself from the
home was not for the welfare of the child,
but for her fear of her inadequacies ... and
that she would receive the rejection of her own
child, as she felt she has been rejected by
others."
CONCLUSION
While the court has announced the doctrine that in
divorce cases it will weigh the evidence and may substitute its
judgment for that of the trial court, the court stated in
MacDonald vs. MacDonald, 120 Utah 573, 236 P. 2d 1066,
(1951):
"Nevertheless, this court should not do so lightly, nor merely because its judgment may differ
from that of the trial judge. We adhere to the
qualifications set forth in the more recent expressions of this court: 'that judgment will not
be disturbed unless the evidence clearly preponderates against the finding of the trial
court; or there has been a plain abuse of discretion; or when a manifest injustice or inequity is wrought'."
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This rule is further borne out by a similar ruling in Curry vs.
Curry, 7 Utah 2d 198, 321 P. 2d 939 (1958). This court in
the case of Johnson vs. Johnson, supra, pointed out the valid
reasons why it should not overrule the trial court unless there
clearly existed evidence which preponderates against his findings, or that there had been an abuse of discretion. It stated:
"Due to the equitable nature of such proceedings, the proper adjudication of which is highly
dependent upon personal equations which the
trial court is in an advantaged position to
appraise, he is allowed considerable latitude
of discretion and his orders will not be disturbed unless it appears that there has been a plain
abuse thereof."
The trial court had the opportunity to observe the
stability of the parties and to receive testimony from them on
four separate days of hearings. These hearings were spread
out over a period of five months, and the prime consideration
of the court was the custody of the child. There is no evidence that the court abused its discretion in awarding the
custody of the child to the father. The ruling of the court
does not manifest injustice or inquity. The evidence does not
clearly preponderate against the findings of the trial court.
Indeed, equity, justice, and the welfare and best interests of
the minor daughter of the parties indicate that the trial court
should be sustained in its decision to award the custody of
the child to the father.
Respectfully submitted,
J. DUFFY PALMER, of and for
HESS, PALMER & VANWAGENEN
40 South 125 East
Clearfield, Utah 84015
Attorneys for PlaintiffRespondent

